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ThefinancialcrisishasledtoseverefiscalimbalancesinmanyOECDcountries.Difficult decisions need to be addressed concerning the speed with which to close wide fiscal deficits given the underlying weakness of activity as well as concerns about long-run fiscal sustainability given ballooning government indebtedness. A key issue in assessing long-run fiscal sustainability is the future trend of the differential between the interest rate paid to service government debt and the growth rate of the economy. For highly indebted countries, a change in this differential of a couple of percentage points, if sustained, could mean the difference between an explosive and a declining path for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, the focus among policy-makers, the media and financial markets on both the level of long-term interest rates and the prospects for growth during the ongoing euro area crisis underlines the importance of this differential as a measure of fiscal sustainability.
In this context, it matters a lot whether OECD countries are likely to face the low interest-rate-growth differential environment which typically prevailed over much of the pre-crisis 2000s or the much higher and less favourable differential which was typical of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. 1 Among a group of selected OECD countries considered in this article the median interest-rate-growth differential fell from almost 2½ percentage points to about zero between these periods, with a much greater fall for those countries which initially had a larger differential. This article attempts to evaluate the relative importance of various explanations for the fall in the differential as a guide to understanding possible future trends, particularly given that there is little in the way of existing published analytical work which looks at this issue in a multi-country framework.
2
The main findings of the article are as follows:
• The decline in uncertainty surrounding inflation, associated with the decline in the level and more particularly the volatility of inflation, has almost certainly contributed to a fall in the interest-rate-growth differential. The empirical work reported in this article suggests that it might have contributed between ¾ and 1 percentage point for the typical OECD country, and by more for those countries where inflation volatility has declined by more. This change is probably the consequence of a general move in the use of monetary policy towards a more credible targeting of inflation. To the extent that inflation expectations remain anchored in the future these gains might be expected to persist. This also suggests some caution in policy-makers attempting to reduce government indebtedness by deliberately engineering a period of high inflation. A period of unexpectedly high inflation will, ceteris paribus, tend to reduce the debt ratio, particularly the longer the maturity structure of debt (see Box 1.8 in OECD Economic
Outlook No. 80). However, this effect could be easily offset if higher inflation led to greater uncertainty about future inflation and so a permanently higher interest-rate-growth differential.
105
• On the other hand, other factors behind the low differential over the last decade are unlikely to persist over the longer term and their reversal is likely to result in an increase in the differential:
❖ Policy rates and short-term interest rates were unusually low for an unusually long time over the last decade, partially in response to fears about the severity of the downturn and the risks of deflation following the sharp fall in equity prices at the end of the 1990s. This, by creating expectations of future low interest rates, almost certainly dragged down long-term interest rates. In the wake of the financial crisis, policy rates in many countries have been further cut to extremely low levels. Although this situation may continue for a few (or even many) years, over the longer run as policy rates normalise this is likely to push up the interest-rate-growth differential.
Estimates in this article suggest that for a typical OECD country this will imply a rise in the interest-rate-growth differential by around 1 to 1¼ percentage points.
❖ This article provides some tentative empirical support for the effect of a "Global Savings
Glut" originating from Asian emerging markets and oil exporters with an estimated effect of reducing the interest-rate-growth differential during the 2000s by around 1¼ to 1½ percentage points. Such a global savings-investment imbalance is unlikely to persist indefinitely. Indeed, there are arguments to suggest that future trends in global savings and investment are more likely to put upward pressure on global interest rates and hence raise the interest-rate-growth differential (Dobbs et al., 2010) .
❖ Other research suggests that quantitative easing measures undertaken since the financial crisis may have reduced long-term interest rates by up to 100 basis points, implying that as the effect of such measures fades there will be a corresponding increase in long-term interest rates.
• One factor which is likely to exert a much larger positive influence on the interest-rategrowth differential over the future is higher fiscal sovereign risk premia associated with increased government indebtedness, which for many countries has increased substantially in the wake of the crisis. Some evidence is found in support of a threshold effect, whereby each percentage point increase in the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio above 75% of GDP leads to an increase in the differential of 4 basis points. According to recent OECD projections (OECD, 2011) , there are likely to be 15 OECD countries with debt ratios exceeding this threshold compared with just six countries immediately prior to the crisis.
• Relative to the pre-crisis period, the change in the interest-rate-growth differential may be particularly large for some euro area countries, as it is clear that over the pre-crisis period the introduction of European Monetary Union led to a marked convergence of long-term interest rates among member countries so masking the effect of individual country characteristics such as indebtedness. Moreover, since the crisis there is evidence to suggest that, ceteris paribus, interest rates in euro countries are more sensitive to indebtedness than other OECD countries, a prediction consistent with the inability of members of a currency union to freely issue their own currency in response to increased government indebtedness. However the current euro area sovereign debt crisis is resolved, it seems likely that fundamentals will play a more important role in determining long-term interest rates of individual countries within EMU in the future.
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The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 1 explains the importance of the interest-rate-growth differential in debt dynamics with a specific illustration with respect to the US fiscal position; Section 2 considers various measurement issues and examines past trends in the differential for OECD countries; Section 3 describes some of the possible explanations for past trends in the differential, namely changes in inflation volatility, policy rates, the "global savings glut", European Monetary Union and government indebtedness; finally, Section 4 attempts to discriminate between these explanations using panel estimations on a large number of OECD countries.
The importance of the interest-rate-growth differential in debt dynamics
The interest-rate-growth differential is essential to understanding long-run fiscal sustainability; higher interest rates imply higher interest payments to service government debt so adversely influencing debt dynamics, whereas higher nominal GDP growth will tend to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio by increasing the denominator. More formally, the importance of the interest-rate-growth differential can be seen from the government budget identity, 3 whereby the change in the net government debt-to-GDP ratio (d) is explained by the primary deficit ratio (-pb) plus net interest rates payments on the previous period's debt, where i t is the effective interest rate paid on net government debt, so that approximately:
where g t is the nominal GDP growth rate. Thus, for a given primary balance and initial net debt ratio, the rate of increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is positively related to the interestrate-growth differential.
In order to illustrate the importance of the interest-rate-growth differential in longterm fiscal projections, the sensitivity of recently published OECD fiscal projections to alternative assumptions regarding this differential are considered. The long-term projections published in June 2011 (OECD, 2011) are based on the stylised assumption that beyond 2012 gradual fiscal consolidation, equal to an improvement in the underlying primary balance of ½ percentage point of GDP each year, is undertaken until the debtto-GDP ratio is stabilised. The United States is one of only two OECD countries for which the stylised gradual fiscal consolidation would be insufficient to stabilise the government debt-to-GDP ratio by 2026, with gross general government debt reaching nearly 150% of GDP, although the rate of increase in the debt ratio is clearly diminishing (Figure 1 ). The importance of the interest-rate-growth differential in debt dynamics, particularly for a highly-indebted country, is illustrated by the substantial difference in two variant simulations in which the differential is alternatively increased and then decreased by 2 percentage points relative to this baseline, assuming that the primary balance remains the same as in the baseline. 4 The calculations underlying this illustrative example ignore the likely interactions and feedback effects from the variables included in the government budget identity (1). For example, if the government boosts the primary surplus in response to a deterioration in the interest-rate-growth differential then a trend increase in the debt ratio could be avoided. On the other hand, other feedback effects may exacerbate the effect of the differential on debt projections:
• The shock to the differential is applied ex post, whereas if applied ex ante there might be reasons to expect further changes to the differential which re-enforce the effect of the original shock; for example, if debt begins to rise as a consequence of a higher differential then fiscal risk premium on debt might be expected to rise; also at higher levels of debt there is some empirical evidence to suggest that there may be some adverse effect on real growth rates (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010 ).
• These stylised fiscal projections are based on the assumption that primary public expenditure remains a stable share of GDP. However, if the differential falls as a result of faster growth it is likely that some components of public expenditure, such as infrastructure expenditure, would rise less than proportionately, which in turn would imply a more rapid reduction in debt.
Measurement issues
In analysing historical trends, the interest-rate-growth differential is here defined differently from how it appears in the budget identity described in equation (1) above. This is both to improve cross-country comparability, which is important when undertaking panel regressions, and to provide a better trend measure which abstracts from volatility, particularly that associated with the cycle, thus:
• Nominal potential GDP growth is used in place of actual GDP growth in order to reduce the volatility associated with the business cycle given that the focus here is on long-term fiscal sustainability. The estimates of potential output which are used are those described in OECD (2011) and are intended to measure the trend level of output which can be sustained without inflationary pressure.
• The interest rate that is used in the analysis here is that on 10-year government bonds which differs from the concept of the implicit interest rate on net government debt used in the budget identity (1) in a number of ways:
❖ The interest rate in the budget identity is the implicit net interest rate paid on net debt and so takes into account the interest receipts earned on government asset holdings. 
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Nevertheless, the empirical analysis here focuses on the rates on 10-year government bonds because there is great heterogeneity in the size and composition of government assets holdings across countries.
❖ The interest rate in the budget identity is the average implicit interest rate paid on all debt which will differ from the interest rate on new issues of government debt. Thus, for example, after a prolonged period when long-term interest rates have been unusually low for a long period (perhaps, for example, because short-term policy rates have been low for cyclical reasons) but have recently begun to rise, then the average interest rate paid on gross government debt will be lower than the rate on new bond issues. However, the latter will provide a more timely indicator of the future trends in the cost of government financing.
❖ The interest rate which is used in the analysis is that on 10-year government bonds which will differ from even the rate of new bond issues if these are issued at different
maturities. An argument for using the former in the analysis is that it is both simpler to implement and will abstract from differences across countries regarding the maturity structure of new bond issues which may well be temporary.
❖ Finally, using a measure of the implicit rate on net government debt in regression analysis is ruled out for many countries because when net government debt (the denominator in any calculation of the implicit rate) becomes very low the implicit rate can easily jump to absurd levels.
Based on the definitions described above (see Annex A1 for further details of the data), the interest-rate-growth differential for a group of OECD countries, for which consistent time series of data is available, shows a marked fall during the 1970s (Figure 2 ) as the inflation rate rose very substantially from levels experienced during the 1960s ( Figure 3 ). As inflation surprises subsided, the level of the interest-rate-growth differential was much higher and for nearly all countries positive during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.
Figure 2. The interest-rate-growth differential for selected OECD countries
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These data also suggest that in periods in which the interest-rate-growth differential is high government indebtedness tends to rise; over the period 1980 to 1995, when the differential was high, OECD gross government debt rose from 44% to 73% of GDP, whereas over the period 1995 to just prior to the crisis in 2007, when the differential was low, there was little change in the debt ratio.
Possible explanations for changes in the interest-rate-growth differential
This section discusses a range of potential explanations for the profile of the OECD interest-rate-growth differential, focusing in particular on the OECD-wide fall in the differential from the early 1980s, before attempting to distinguish between them empirically in the following section.
Financial repression
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on OECD interest-rate-growth differentials since 1980 because the extent of financial repression measures among OECD countries prior to 1980 suggests that the determinants of interest rates on long-term government bonds is unlikely to be a useful guide to the experience since 1980 . Financial repression includes direct lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross border capital movements and was widespread among OECD countries until the end of the 1970s. Reinhart and Sbrancia (op. cit.) argue that this helps to explain why, among a sample of advanced economies, real interest rates were negative roughly half of the time during 1945-80. The combination of financial repression together with large inflation shocks also explains why measures of real interest rates were substantially negative for many OECD countries during much of the 1970s.
While the period since 1980 is subject to less distortion from financial repression measures, there is an argument that such measures-defining "financial repression" more broadly to include government policies to channel fund to themselves that in a deregulated financial market would go elsewhere-have returned as part of the response to the financial crisis . The most obvious form which this has taken is direct large- bonds by up to 100 basis points (Joyce et al., 2011 and Gagnan et al., 2011) in the post-crisis period. These factors are not directly accounted for in the empirical analysis reported in the subsequent section. Nevertheless, to the extent that such measures are unlikely to be sustained over the longer-term, they serve to further emphasise the concern which emerges from the rest of the empirical analysis that the interest-rate-growth differential is likely to rise over the medium term from current levels.
Lower and less volatile inflation
There is some evidence to suggest that inflation uncertainty is an important component of bond risk premia; certainly the decline in the interest-rate-growth differential broadly corresponds with the decline in both level and volatility of OECD inflation (Figure 3 ). In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the largest reductions in term premia occurred in countries that made radical changes in their monetary policy frameworks, such as introducing inflation targets and increasing the independence of their central banks (Wright, 2011) .
The global savings glut
According to the "global savings glut" hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) , increased capital inflows to the United States from countries in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment -particularly Asian emerging markets and non-OECD oil exporterswere an important reason why long-term interest rates were lower than expected in the precrisis 2000s. Although the argument was originally applied to the United States, in principle it seems likely that it might also apply more generally to the advanced OECD economies.
A crude measure of the ex ante imbalance between global savings and investment is the ex post current account surplus of the Asian emerging markets and oil exporters expressed as percentage of world GDP (Figure 4 ) which is used here in the subsequent empirical analysis. There will, of course, always be some countries running a current account surplus so taking a subset of these and referring to it as a measure of a "global savings glut" is admittedly crude. Nevertheless, these countries are singled out here because they ran up large current account surpluses so rapidly -because of massive structural reform, fiscal adjustment or swings in commodity prices -that there was no possibility to easily absorb the additional savings in domestic investment opportunities.
A prolonged period of low policy rates
If long-term interest rates are considered as a forward convolution of expected shortterm interest rates plus term premia, it follows that large deviations of short-term rates which are expected to persist over a period of many years will also pull long-term interest rates away from their more fundamental levels. Monetary policy exerts a powerful influence on short-term market interest rates. In particular, policy rates have been unusually low for an unusually long time over much of the last decade, in response firstly to fears about the severity of the downturn and the risks of deflation following the sharp 5 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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fall in equity prices at the end of the 1990s and, more recently, in response to the financial crisis ( Figure 5 ). This, by creating expectations of future low interest rates, almost certainly dragged down long-term interest rates. Thus, a prolonged period of exceptionally low (or high) policy rates would be expected to lower (raise) long-term interest rates, and hence the interest-rate-growth differential, contemporaneously. 6
A fiscal risk premium related to government indebtedness
There is a large and controversial empirical literature that examines the impact of public deficits and debt on long-term government bond yields. 7 Drawing on this literature, an assumption which has been adopted for the purpose of recent long-term OECD projections is that when gross government indebtedness passes a threshold of 75% of GDP then long-term interest rates increase by 4 basis points for every additional percentage point increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio-an assumption consistent with the findings of Égert (2010) and Laubach (2009) . 8 Although such thresholds are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, it is clear that the number of countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above this ratio has risen substantially in the aftermath of the recent crisis ( Figure 6 ).
Nevertheless, it is clear from the recent experience of euro area countries that concerns about government indebtedness vary not only with the magnitude of indebtedness, but with the general perception of risk in financial markets (see for example Haugh et al., 2009) , so that identifying such effects in time series analysis over long estimation periods is inherently difficult.
European Monetary Union
The European Monetary Union (EMU) led to a narrowing of spreads among member countries ( Figure 7 ) probably because indebted countries did not have the option to tackle fiscal problems through a lax monetary policy, higher inflation and currency depreciation, 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Empirical analysis
In order to assess the relative importance of the various explanations discussed in the previous section, annual panel regressions explaining the interest-rate-growth differential (as defined in Section 2 above) are run for selected OECD countries for which a long time span of data is available, mostly covering the period 1980-2010. 10 A potential problem in estimation is that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable may lead to biased estimates (Nickell, 1981) , although because the time dimension here is relatively large (exceeding 30), the extent of the bias is likely to be small (see for example, Baltagi and Griffin, 1997). Nevertheless, in order to correct for any possible bias, the bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic unbalanced panel data models proposed by Bruno (2005) has been applied. 11
The simplest panel regression, equation (1) in Table 2 , explains the interest-rategrowth differential in terms of its own lag, a 5-year standard deviation of inflation measured according to the GDP deflator and the lagged difference between a 3-month interest rate (a Treasury bill rate or similar) and the 10-year government bond rate (see Table 3 for summary statistics). 12 The estimated coefficients are all statistically significant ). The standard errors of the coefficients have been obtained with a bootstrap analysis, using 100 iterations.
Notes: Key to variables: (irl -g) = the interest growth differential, see also Table 1 and Section 2; SD 5 (P) = 5-year standard deviation of inflation, where the latter is measured by the change in the GDP deflator; (irs-irl) = the slope of the yield curve measured as the difference between short-and long-term interest rates, see also Section 3.4 and Figure 5 ; "Global savings glut" = Combined current account surpluses of Asian emerging economies and oil exporting countries, see also Section 3.3 and Figure 4 ; Debt > 75 = zero if gross government debt as a share of GDP is less than 75%, otherwise is equal to the excess of this share above 75%; Dum200910 = a dummy variable taking the value unity in the post-crisis years of 2009 and 2010 and zero elsewhere; (irl DEU -g) is the difference between German long-term interest rates and own-country growth. For further details of all variables used see Annex A1. For equation (6), the explanatory variables SD 5 (), "Global savings glut" and Debt > 75 are all multiplied by a dummy variable defined as (1-EMU), where EMU takes the value of unity for all non-German EMU countries over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Essentially, the role of this variable is to exclude the effect of the variables SD 5 (), "Global savings glut" and Debt > 75 on non-German EMU countries over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 4 . Difference between a 3-month short-term interest rate (usually the Treasury bill rate or similar) and the interest rate on 10-year government bonds. 5. The current account surpluses of emerging Asian economies and major oil exporters expressed as a percentage of world GDP. also implies that a normalisation of the yield curve from conditions prevailing in 2010 might be expected to increase the interest-rate-growth differential by around 1 percentage point.
13
A proxy measure of the global saving glut is taken to be the sum of current account surpluses in Asian emerging markets and non-OECD oil exporters (see Section 3.3 and Annex A1). When this variable is added, equation (2) in Table 2 , the coefficients on the existing explanatory variables remain statistically significant, but the size of the effect from the inflation variability variable falls [comparing equations (1) and (2) in both Table 2 and Table 4 ]. The new variable has the expected sign and is statistically significant, and implies that the emergence of the global savings glut in the 2000s reduced the interestrate-growth differential by about 1¼ percentage points across all OECD countries. The global savings glut hypothesis, as originally formulated by Bernanke (2005) , particularly focused on the effect on US interest rates, however variant equations (not reported here) did not find a statistically significantly larger effect on the United States compared with other OECD countries. As previously mentioned in Section 3.3, the global savings glut variable is inevitably a crude proxy measure because it is not really possible to measure an ex ante global savings-investment imbalance. An alternative explanation of the significance of this variable is that it is picking up some other effect which differentiated the 2000s from earlier decades, for example it might be picking up a general under-pricing of risk in financial markets.
Rather than conduct an exhaustive search (or fishing expedition) of different ways in which government indebtedness might impact on the differential, it was decided to include it in a form which would most easily allow the effect of debt on interest rates assumed in recent OECD Economic Outlook to be tested. Thus, the extent to which general government debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 75% was included as an explanatory variable (for those countries/periods in which the debt ratio was less than 75% the variable takes the value of zero), see equation (3) in Table 2 . This debt variable is statistically significant and implies a marginal effect such that each percentage point in debt in excess of 75% eventually raises the interest-rate-growth differential by 4 basis points, which coincidentally is what is assumed in recent Economic Outlook exercises. However, the fragility of this result is underlined by the inclusion of an additional variable, measured as the product of the same debt variable and a post-crisis dummy variable, see equation (4) in Table 2 , which implies that the pre-crisis effect of debt is much weaker and statistically insignificant and the post-crisis debt effect much larger; thus pre-crisis, a percentage point increase in the debt ratio above the 75% threshold implied an increase in the differential of 3 basis points, whereas post-crisis it implies an increase of 8 basis points. Further Source: OECD calculations based on the results reported in Table 2 .
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regressions, not reported here, suggest that the increased effect from indebtedness in the post-crisis period is mostly accounted for by the euro area countries. This result is consistent with the finding that interest rate spreads may be more sensitive to perceived imbalances within a currency union because of the inability of individual member countries to freely issue currency to finance increased indebtedness (de Grauwe, 2011) .
A final pair of regressions explore the effect that European Monetary Union had on the interest-rate-growth differential (Table 2 , equations 5 and 6). Given the evidence that EMU led to a striking convergence of long-term interest rates (Figure 7) Also of interest is that the long-run effect of most of the explanatory variables for non-EMU countries is little affected by these EMU variant equations (Table 4) , with the possible exception of the effect of the global savings glut variable which has a slightly larger and more statistically significant effect.
Notes
1. The focus of this paper is on explaining the interest-rate-growth differential of some OECD economies since 1980. The corresponding differential for developing countries is typically much lower, and usually negative, which mainly appears to be the consequence of financial repression (Escolano et al., 2011 and IMF, 2011a) . The experience of OECD countries prior to 1980 is excluded from the empirical analysis because the widespread use of financial repression measures coupled with the large inflation shades of the 1970s suggests that the experience of interest rates prior to 1980 will not be informative of the experience since then.
2. An illustration of the lack of any analytical foundation for projecting the differential is that, for the purpose of making medium-term fiscal projections to 2030 for the "Advanced Economies", the IMF assume in their regular Fiscal Monitor publication that "up to 2015, an interest-rate-growth differential of 0 percentage points …, broadly in line with WEO assumptions, and 1 percentage point afterwards, regardless of country-specific circumstances" (IMF, 2011b ), yet there is little or no justification or discussion of the basis for this assumption despite its importance.
3. This ignores stock-flow adjustments which have been particularly important over the crisis period, see IMF, 2011b.
4. The baseline projection is consistent with a rise in the interest-rate-growth differential to just under 2 percentage points by 2026. The lower debt path would be consistent with an interest-rategrowth differential of around zero percentage points which is similar to that experienced by the United States over the last decade, whereas the high debt path would be consistent with a differential rising to about 4 percentage points.
5. The sharp drop in forward rates in the United Kingdom on the day the Bank of England was granted operational independence, is also cited as further evidence of this effect (Wright, 2011) .
6. The slope of the yield curve is also a well-known predictor of GDP growth, however this effect is not captured in the regressions estimated here because GDP growth in the interest-rate-growth differential is de-trended.
7. See Box 4.5 in OECD (2010) for a selective survey.
8. Égert (2010) finds that the difference between short-term and long-term interest rates appear to be a non-linear function of public debt for the G7 countries (excluding Japan) in recent years. The estimation results indicate a 4 basis point increase in long-term rates relative to short-term rates for each percentage point of GDP in public debt above 76%. Laubach (2009) focuses on the United States and finds that long-term yields increase about 25 basis points per percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio, and 3 to 4 basis points per percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
9. In May 1998, the 11 countries that would initially participate in EMU were selected and, in June 1998, the ECB was created.
10. The panel is unbalanced, because there are some countries for which data are not complete over the full sample period. The results for individual country regressions are not presented as in many cases estimated coefficients were statistically insignificant. Further details are given in Annex A1.
11. Indeed, a simple least squares estimation with country fixed effects (with no correction for the presence of a lagged dependent variable) gives similar results, as reported in Annex A2, to those reported in the main body of the paper based on the estimator proposed by Bruno (2005) .
12. The results are robust to using different measures of inflation, such as ones based on the Consumer Price Index or Private Consumption Expenditure Deflator. For further details on the variables used in the estimation see Annex A1.
13. This calculation assumes that in the absence of cyclical influences, long-term interest rates would be expected to exceed short-term rates by about ½ percentage point because of a term premium.
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ANNEX A1
Data description
The data used in this article cover selected OECD member countries over the period 1980-2010. These countries were selected to maximise the time span of the panel dataset so that the maximum number of observations per variable would be 713. However, due to the gaps in the data for some countries, particularly Greece and Iceland, the effective number of observations used in each regression is slightly lower. The exact country coverage of the variables is presented in Table A1 . The simple model, corresponding to equation (1) in Table 2 , includes the following variables:
• The interest-rate-growth differential as dependent variable defined as the difference between the levels of the interest rate on 10-year government bonds and nominal potential GDP growth.* In the case of Norway, potential GDP estimates refer to the mainland economy, • Inflation volatility is measured as a five-year standard deviation of inflation, where the latter refers to the change in the GDP deflator.
• The slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between short-term interest rates (generally three-month Treasury bill rate) and long-term interest rates on 10-year Treasury bonds.
This model is subsequently extended with the inclusion of one or more of the following variables:
• A proxy measure of the global savings glut in equation (2) in Table 2 , obtained by combining current account surpluses of Asian emerging economies and main oil exporting countries expressed as percentage of world GDP. Specifically, the two country groups selected from the WEO were "Developing Asia" and "Middle East and North
Africa" (for more details on the groups composition see Table A1 .2).
• A variable measuring high government indebtedness is included in equation (3) of Table 2 , and constructed for each country as the excess of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio when this share is above the threshold of 75% of GDP, and zero otherwise.
• A dummy variable taking value unity in the post-crisis years of 2009 and 2010 and zero elsewhere is used in equation (4) of Table 2 to construct the interaction term that allows for the testing of a differential effect from debt in the post-crisis years.
• A lagged variable measuring the differential between German long-term interest rates and other own-country growth in other EMU countries over the period 1998-2008 is considered in equation (5), Table 2 .
• Finally, a dummy variable taking value unity for Euro area countries-with the exception of Germany-from 1998 to 2008 included and zero elsewhere, is used to exclude the influence of inflation volatility, global savings glut and debt variable for non-Germany EMU countries over that specific period from equation (6) in Table 2 . 
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ANNEX A2
Least squares panel estimation results Table A2 .1 below reports the results of a least squares dynamic panel regression estimated with country fixed effects (with no correction for the presence of a lagged dependent variable) and Table A2 .2 reports the long-run effects of the explanatory variables derived from those estimates. These tables can be compared with Tables 2 and 4, respectively, in the main text, although the differences are generally quite small. 
